W(h)ither the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)? W(h)ither constructivism? Fixity of norms and the ASEAN Way by Alan, Collins
 Cronfa -  Swansea University Open Access Repository
   
_____________________________________________________________
   
This is an author produced version of a paper published in:
International Relations
                                  
   
Cronfa URL for this paper:
http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa48328
_____________________________________________________________
 
Paper:
Collins, A. (2019).  W(h)ither the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), w(h)ither constructivism: Fixity of
norms and the ASEAN Way. International Relations, 004711781983046
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047117819830469
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________
  
This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms
of the repository licence. Copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior
permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work
remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium
without the formal permission of the copyright holder.
 
Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from the original author.
 
Authors are personally responsible for adhering to copyright and publisher restrictions when uploading content to the
repository.
 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/library/researchsupport/ris-support/ 
 1 
 
W(h)ither the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), w(h)ither Constructivism: 
fixity of norms and the ASEAN Way 
 
Abstract: 
 
This article uses the reflection on the direction (whither) and health (wither) of 
Constructivism and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that was witnessed 
in 2017 to see what these deliberations reveal about the fixity of norms and their 
contestation. The argument presented is that constitutive norms create fixed parameters of 
shared understandings but that within those parameters the meaning and application of the 
norm can be contested and debated. This insight helps to bridge the gap between 
conventional and critical constructivists and shows that the premise of jettisoning the ASEAN 
Way as necessary for ASEAN to achieve its ambitious community-building project is flawed. 
The argument relies on insights from the constructivist literature on norm degeneration to 
show how contestation is not one part of a norm’s life cycle but rather a constant companion. 
However norms are not just contested but they have fixity and here practice theory can help 
show that the social world is just as much about continuity as it is change. The ASEAN case 
study is timely as introspection about the efficacy of its constitutive norms - the ASEAN Way - 
was prominent in 2017 as ASEAN turned fifty.  
 
Introduction: 
 
Turning fifty in 2017 elicited a number of opinion pieces on the health (wither?) and future 
direction (whither?) of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and this 
coincided with a similar reflection on the health and direction of Constructivism in 
International Relations. In both cases the debates and discussions were not new, but given 
Constructivism’s application to ASEAN this introspection provides an opportunity to discern 
whether the w(h)ither of both helps to inform the other? 
 
The inspiration for this article’s title lies in Swati Srivastava’s contribution to the 2017 online 
symposium, “Seizing Constructivist Ground? Practice and Relational Theories”.1 In reference 
to an International Studies Association-Northeast conference roundtable in 2012 entitled 
“Whither Constructivism?”, Srivastava noted that the participants, instead of discussing the 
direction of constructivism (whither), deliberated about its demise (wither). The demise 
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focuses on what David McCourt’s article, which inspired the online symposium, refers to as 
the fractal distinction of constructivism, which is essentially the division of the constructivist 
approach into a number of camps, as a consequence of a cyclical rise and fall of theories’ 
prominence.2 Of these divisions within constructivism the distinction between conventional 
or mainstream and critical is the clearest, with the prominence of the former over the latter, 
and the extent to which this reflected a betrayal of the early constructivist writings, 
underpinning the sense of lament about wither constructivism.3 
 
Whether constructivism is on the wane drew different interpretations of a 2014 Teaching, 
Research, and International Policy (TRIP) survey of the profession. In keeping with 
McCourt’s fractal distinction, Jarrod Hayes interprets the TRIP as a discouraging picture for 
constructivism with its fragmentation as a coherent research programme and the infighting 
between the conventional and critical factions. It is only by overcoming these divisions – ‘the 
need to reclaim constructivism from itself by raising awareness of these social dynamics, 
combating them, and refocusing attention on the core of the intellectual agenda’ – that 
constructivism can be more than a ‘convenient foil for rationalist approaches’.4 In contrast, 
Ted Hopf interprets TRIP as evidence of constructivism’s rude health, and that it is precisely 
its breadth and ability to accommodate diverse social theories that has ‘spawned a lively and 
growing interest’ in constructivism and, along with realism and liberalism, it constitutes IR’s 
‘Holy Trinity’.5 If the future direction and health of constructivism is open to debate then 
much the same can be said for ASEAN. The year 2017 witnessed a range of opinion pieces 
commenting on ASEAN as it turned fifty. As with constructivism, not all lamented the state 
of the Association, and some were positively glowing about its achievements – 
‘transformative’6; ‘miracle’, ‘world star’ and one deserving a Noble Peace Prize7 – but there 
was a distinct sense that ASEAN faced a series of crises and adjectives such as, adrift, 
confused, divided and weak were and remain common place. In essence, that ASEAN’s 
future direction (whither) is far from certain, including a future of increasing irrelevance 
(wither).8  
 
In this article I seek to determine whether it is whither or wither for constructivism and 
ASEAN by examining what is at the heart of both; socially constructed norms and how the 
answer to w(h)ither relies on understanding the fixity of constitutive norms. By fixity I mean 
different actors acknowledge the existence of a constitutive norm – which is a ‘set of 
practices that make up a particular class of consciously [or unconsciously] organized social 
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activity-that is to say, they specify what counts as that activity’ (emphasis in original)9 – and 
in so doing establish parameters within which the shared meaning of the norm, both what it is 
and its application, can be contested. It is not the same as norm rigidity, which implies that 
the shared meaning is uniformly agreed and non-compliance is exposed by norm violation. I 
argue that constructivism’s core intellectual agenda – explaining why the international 
system, and its component units, are socially constructed and therefore subject to change – is 
broad enough to encompass the continuity that arises from a norm’s fixity while concurrently 
appreciating that contestation exists that marks different interpretations of the norm.  That is, 
a shared understanding need not mean unambiguous agreement as to content and application 
of the norm, but rather a vague but nevertheless deeply entrenched understanding of the 
norm’s parameters. Indeed, it is this looseness of definition that makes the norm more 
resilient as it provides a site for contestation. Although constructivism divided into 
conventional and critical camps, this article shows that as the norm literature has evolved the 
distinction between how the camps interpret norms has grown closer and that Practice Theory 
is a significant contributor to this outcome. The notion that Practice Theory is constructivist 
is controversial and the article will explain why it can be interpreted in this way by showing 
how it is compatible with the logic of appropriateness.   
 
The article proceeds by firstly delineating the similarity and difference between conventional 
and critical constructivists before utilising the literature on norm degeneration to reveal that 
ambiguity makes norms more resilient. The article then examines the seemingly paradoxical 
statement that norms are both a shared understanding and contested. It is this correlation that 
enables norms to be both fixed and ambiguous. This is important because while 
constructivism is interested in change, the social world is just as marked by continuity. Here 
notions of practice and habit can assist in explaining both continuity and change. ASEAN is 
helpful in illuminating this because its modus operandi, the ASEAN Way, is both fixed in 
what its constitutive norms are but the meaning and application of these norms is routinely 
contested. Not only does this help to show how both conventional and critical constructivist 
approaches can complement one another, but it also shines a light on the current introspection 
on ASEAN and why contestation over its constitutive norms is not a degeneration of the 
ASEAN Way, but rather a reaffirmation of the ASEAN Way as it adjusts to different 
contexts.   
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Wither Constructivism? 
 
The promise of constructivism is that it offers the chance for actors in the international 
system to change the nature of the environment in which they operate; hence the classic 
constructivist overtones that ‘the world is of our making’10 and ‘anarchy is what states make 
of it’.11 It is not though confined to just altering the structure of the international system but 
constructivism also posits change at the level of the agent. Thus not only does state 
interaction determine whether the nature of the international system is conflictual or 
cooperative, but this interaction can also change the actor’s sense of their own self-worth and 
their self-identification. It is, via the process of interaction and engagement, that ideas mould 
a shared understanding about what constitutes best practice and this leads to a desire amongst 
these actors to adopt these practices; which is referred to as socialisation. States can thus 
change their identity through an understanding of the world they inhabit, not just as a 
consequence of material factors but ideas about how the world operates.  The shared 
understandings that emerge from such interactions are referred to as norms, and it is the 
extent to which these norms become “fixed”, “hardened”, “crystallised” that is one key point 
of contention between conventional and critical constructivists.  
 
Conventional constructivists have focused their attention on how these norms emerge and 
diffuse throughout the international system. While initially the focus was primarily on 
successfully norm creation and adoption more recent studies have concentrated on those 
instances where norms have failed to take root; either they did not gain traction or they 
degenerate. It is a veritable hive of scholarly activity and does not, at first glance, appear to 
give the impression of constructivism on the wane. The literature on how ideas are 
propagated in the first place (there is no normative vacuum) has empowered the role of non-
state actors, and these norm entrepreneurs have been joined in the literature by 
“antipreneurs”12 and “rival entrepreneurs”.13 These tools explain the contestation that marks 
the emergence of understandings about what constitutes appropriate practice. Models exist 
that provide a framework for understanding the different stages of norm development – 
norms have life cycles14 and they can emerge and diffuse through a spiral model,15 which has 
been refined.16 When norms spread to different regions of the world they can be further 
contested as they are adapted to different contexts; hence a process of localisation,17 
subsidiarity18 and mimicking19 can occur.  
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Why then do scholars bemoan the demise of constructivism? It is in large part about what 
some early constructivists saw in the potential of constructivism to challenge the positivism 
of IR scholarship and thus to question the epistemology of the dominant rationalist 
approaches.20 If the world is of our making then the world we inhabit reflects the wishes of 
the powerful elites and our interpretation is constrained by the discourse that entraps our 
understanding. If ideas shape our social world then challenging conventional interpretations 
of the world is what scholars should be doing. Constructivism thus held out the promise of 
challenging what the purpose of IR theory was and casting new light on how we see the 
world. The lament about wither constructivism is that as it evolved it did not do this, and 
those scholars have subsequently abandoned the label constructivism and found refuge in a 
variety of reflectivist approaches, such as post-structuralism and post-modernism. Why 
constructivism evolved as it did has been explained by a cyclical understanding of how ideas 
rise and fall21 and a pernicious academic environment that silences alternative ways of 
thinking; hence Srivastava’s claim that ‘Constructivism was not simply going through the 
motions of paradigmatic turnover; it was deliberately cut down to privilege certain 
perspectives over others’.22  So, what did conventional constructivists do “wrong”? 
 
The broader answer lies in getting too cosy with the positivism of rational explanations but I 
want to examine this divergence through the importance attached to norms, in particular their 
fixity and ability to guide and restrain actors’ behaviour. Conventional constructivism’s 
examination of where new ideas emerge to challenge the pre-existing social world appears to 
take the notion that the world is of our making as the exception rather than the rule of 
international relations. That is, a norm entrepreneur engages in a verbal battle with 
antipreneurs and rival entrepreneurs as they use forums and institutions to persuade states that 
a new understanding is needed. This period of contestation will determine the success, or 
failure, for the new norm’s emergence. Whether it is successful will be determined by a 
number of factors including those beyond the control of the actors, such as the context in 
which the verbal contestation is occurring. It is the cut and thrust of debate, negotiation and 
persuasion, that captures the notion of change that is central to constructivism. If the norm 
entrepreneur is successful then a tipping point will be achieved in the norms uptake and a 
cascade will follow as states adopt the norm. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm is a 
good example of where a changing context – the increase in humanitarian intervention 
following the Cold War – created propitious conditions to challenge the prevailing view that 
sovereignty protected a state from intervention in its domestic affairs from other states. The 
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problem with this conventional constructivist explanation is that the change has come to an 
end. A new norm is formed that guides state’s behaviour and as long as no new norm 
emerges to challenge it, the norm will restrain states as they are obliged to act in conformity 
to it. The norm has become fixed, hardened, crystallised.    
 
Given its restraining effect on state action this appears to replace material considerations that 
guide and regulate state behaviour in Realism with ideas that do the same; hence the 
accusation that if conventional constructivism is a bridge between rationalism and 
reflectivism it is closer to rationalism. Norms, for critical constructivists, do not regulate 
behaviour they are a product of state interaction that are forever undergoing interpretation 
and reinterpretation. Contestation is not a stage in a norm’s life cycle; it is a description of the 
interaction that states engage in as they converse. R2P is not rigid it remains, and always will, 
deeply contested and if actors act in accordance with the norm this reflects their interpretation 
and one likely to be contested by others. Norms are not therefore the product of uniform 
shared understandings, but rather beliefs or practices that states draw upon to understand the 
world they inhabit and how to engage in it. It is this process of interpretation and 
reinterpretation through state interaction that gives critical constructivism its understanding of 
why change happens. It understands the power games played in framing the contention and 
trying to crowd out alternative voices, which remain ongoing, rather than creating spectrums 
along which one can place a norm’s evolution.  
 
While these two positions appear to be polls apart, and I acknowledge that they have a 
different epistemology, I contend that actually there is a middle ground that enables both to 
benefit from the insight of the other. This has arisen from the conventional constructivist 
literature and its refinement over the fixity of norms. 
 
Whither Constructivism? 
 
It was noted earlier that the current literature on norms is increasingly focused on norms that 
do not get adopted or disappear. That is, the norm does not become fixed, or it did but is no 
longer. This reveals that contestation is not one part of the life cycle but rather a constant 
companion through the stages (conventional) or interactions (critical). If contestation marks 
the existence of a norm then what does this mean for the notion of shared understanding? I 
contend that a shared understanding need not imply a specific, even agreed upon 
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understanding, but rather a vague and possibly incoherent understanding. For example, a 
national identity has meaning and is a shared by many, but when scrutinised as to what it 
means to be, for example British, or that immigrants wishing to live in the UK should learn 
British values, the discussion that follows reveals more deviation than conformity.23 This idea 
that shared understandings can be divergent in their meaning reveals an ambiguity that closes 
the gap between conventional and critical constructivists. Why? Because it fits with the 
latter’s focus on contestation and interpretation but also, and this will appear counter-
intuitive, the former’s revelation that the vaguer the norm the more resilient it is. How then 
can it be both resilient and contested? 
 
Panke and Petersohn’s work on norms that disappear24 or Krook and True’s that they are 
dynamic and this dynamism makes them resilient, provides the answer.25 Panke and 
Petersohn interpret norms as having a prescriptive character that regulates and prohibits 
certain state actions, and it degenerates if it loses this prescriptive status. Adopting the life 
cycle’s terminology of cascade they argue that a norm will disappear, ‘when an actor’s norm 
violation triggers a non-compliance cascade because other states also adjust their behaviour 
and violate the norm’.26  The cascade thus marks a spiralling process of non-compliance and 
the norm dies when ‘the emerging new practice is no longer framed as non-compliance’.27 
Panke and Petersohn are interested in why some norms are replaced or just disappear, and 
why some do so quickly while for others the process is incremental. Their approach is 
conventional constructivism – ‘International norms regulate state behaviour on the 
international level’28 – and adopts a rational explanation; ‘If the norm is regarded as 
functional, it is not likely that many states will seek to abolish the norm’.29 Whatever the 
merits of this approach, one of their significant findings is that imprecise norms, which they 
define as norms with poorly defined procedures and exceptions to its applicatory scope, are 
less vulnerable to cascades than precisely defined norms. This is because the vagueness of the 
norm enables a state to disguise its violation and this could lead to the norm’s disappearance, 
and if it does, it is likely to be incremental and not rapid. It is pertinent to note that the 
ambiguity of the norm is the vagueness of its application rather than its core meaning. While 
this bears little resemblance to the critical constructivists’ understanding of norms it does 
enable us to identify imprecision as a criterion for making norms resilient. The link to critical 
constructivism can be seen in Krook and True’s article where the focus is on norms as 
processes, rather than things that have fixed meaning.   
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In their article, Krook and True are interested in the process of diffusion and how that process 
alters norms.  They distance themselves from the notion that the meaning of a norm becomes 
fixed as it cascades and they instead see the life cycle of the norm, both as it emerges and 
diffuses, as a constant arena of contestation. For Krook and True this contestation is marked 
by discursive battles in which actors interpret and reinterpret the norm and draw upon the 
existing normative environment to help clarify the norm’s meaning. They argue that because 
norm emergence and its adoption is an outcome of this contestation, ‘norms diffuse precisely 
because – rather than despite the fact that – they may encompass different meanings, fit in 
with a variety of contexts, and be subject to framing by diverse actors’.30 This is why they see 
norms as a discursive process. Two findings emerge. First, norms are more resilient if there is 
ambiguity about their meaning because this gives actors more leeway in their interpretation. 
This goes further than the application of the norm as noted by Panke and Petersohn to the 
actual meaning of the norm. Second, norms emerge and exist because of state action, which 
could be discursive but not be limited to this, and thus they do not become something 
separate from the actors which can constrain them. Once conceived as an arena of 
contestation we are moving closer to critical constructivism and here Niemann and 
Schillinger help to close the gap.31 
 
Niemann and Schillinger are interested in how the meaning of the norm, not just its 
application but what it actually is, can be continually and consistently contested and be a 
shared understanding; they write, ‘A contested norm…represents almost a contradiction in 
terms, as it is difficult to imagine that norms can be both contested and shared at the same 
time’ (emphasis in original).32 Consequently they see contestation as a ‘profound challenge to 
[norm research’s] theoretical core’.33 They utilise the work of Antje Wiener34 who adopts a 
critical constructivist approach.35 In Wiener’s reflectivist reading of norms, the meaning of 
norms are not fixed but determined by the context in which they are used. That is, the norm 
has meaning for an actor only in a particular context; hence Wiener’s “enacting meaning-in-
use”.36 Niemann and Schillinger though critique Wiener’s work, and in so doing, raise 
questions more broadly for the critical constructivist approach. If the actors engage in 
dialogue, discussion, interpretation and reinterpretation of the norm and this contestation is 
on-going, what determines their understanding of the norm? Where do the actors’ 
understandings come from? For Niemann and Schillinger, Wiener’s answer lies in the actors’ 
normative background knowledge and the contestation is a form of “cultural validation” of 
each actor’s position. Hence Wiener argues ‘individuals are prone to carry normative 
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baggage wherever they go’.37 Contestation is thus undertaken between actors with different 
“cultural scripts” which are fixed. This is beginning to resemble the conventional 
constructivist position, hence Niemann and Schillinger’s critique of Wiener: ‘Cultural 
structures rather than contextual interpretation (that is, meaning-in-use) becomes the source 
of norm meaning’.38  
 
This is the move that begins to close the gap between the two constructivist positions. 
Normative baggage is the result of internalised cultural practices that are, largely 
unconsciously, guiding and directing behaviour. They are for the most part invisible and only 
become visible, as Niemann and Schillinger argue, when diverging interpretations of the 
norm clash. From a conventional constructivist position norms are replaced by the actor’s 
cultural script as the fixed element that is explaining behaviour. Norm contestation is thus 
likely when actors with different normative cultural backgrounds engage one another. This 
does of course presume that culture is stable and uncontested. From a critical constructivist 
perspective it enables the meaning of norms to be contested because international actors 
come from a variety of different cultural backgrounds. Wiener’s examples are drawn from the 
different cultural scripts amongst European states and the cultural diversity of the ASEAN 
membership is no less marked. This means that we can understand the meaning of norms to 
be open to contestation, as critical constructivists would endorse, as the actors rely on their 
separate cultural scripts to interpret and reinterpret the norm depending upon the context.  
 
It is this notion of an unconscious cultural script, or normative background, guiding, or 
providing parameters in which actors operate, which makes Practice theory a bridge between 
the two constructivist positions. It was Iver Neumann in 2002, while working in the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who introduced to International Relations a body of 
thought he called "practice theory". He wanted to answer the question: how does one know 
what diplomats do?39 Practice is the everyday activity of diplomats, or for IR, actors. Their 
activity is an enactment process based upon a, largely unconscious, cultural script. It contains 
both continuity and change. Continuity, in that practice entails routines that are regularly 
repeated and thus produce predictable behaviour. Change, in that this repeated routine can 
produce altered process that can lead to adjusted behaviour. For example, the idiom “practice 
makes perfect” contains both the routine behaviour of continuity (perseverance, dedication) 
and change (correcting, improving). This is never ending, as in sport where players are 
always training because no matter how good they are they can always be better. While the 
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idiom “practice makes perfect” is easily recognisable and thus helpful to illuminate the point, 
as with all parsimony it obscures as well as enlightens. The point is not betterment; in the 
example of the sportsman the adjustments are deliberately made to change/improve their 
ability. Practice theory is that adjustments in everyday routines can be made unconsciously 
thus making the routine different from before. The only routine that is unchanging is 
automation by non-sentient beings, such as robots on a production line. Practice theory 
therefore does provide an explanation of how change can occur, but I contend its more 
important insight is that it explains continuity and here its relationship to the logic of 
appropriateness needs clarification. 
 
Practice theory is often posited as separate from the logic of appropriateness, whereas it is 
actually an example of one type of appropriate behaviour. McCourt writes,  
 
Practice theory opposes IR’s two main ways of accounting for social action: the logic 
of consequences and the logic of appropriateness…often people behave in certain ways 
neither because they want to nor because they feel they should, as rationalist and norm-
centered approaches suggest, but because it is “what one does”.40  
 
The logic of appropriateness does though account for actors behaving as they do because it 
also explains “what one does”. Ole Jacob Sending refers to this understanding of the logic of 
appropriateness as ‘motivationally internalist’; since the norm constitutes who and what the 
actor is, it is ‘beyond the reach of criticism, reflection and potential violation’.41 This reading 
of the logic of appropriateness makes its logic the same as that underpinning practice and 
indeed habit.42 Both Ted Hopf and Vincent Pouliot argue that operating according to logic of 
either habit or practice does not entail a conscious decision on the part of the actor at all; 
hence Pouliot argues practice is ‘unreflexive’, ‘thoughtless and inarticulate’,43 while Hopf 
writes that, ‘Habits are unintentional, unconscious, involuntary, and effortless’.44 
Consequently, both see action according to their logics as automatic because rather than 
having a normative bias – in circumstance X, you should do Y – a habitual response is that in 
circumstance X, action Y follows. However, Sending’s ‘motivationally internalist’ reading of 
the logic of appropriateness produces the same result. The founders of the logic of 
appropriateness, James March and Johan Olsen, write that while ‘behavior is intentional it is 
not willful’, that is, it is not deliberated over, and so ‘Action stems from a conception of 
necessity, rather than preference’.45 To further emphasize the automaticity of this logic they 
11 
 
conclude actor’s actions are a response to the ‘dictates of their identities’ and a failure ‘to 
fulfil the identity-defining duties and obligations is equated to approach the insane’.46  Thus 
while Practice theorists may wish to distance themselves from the logic of appropriateness, 
when conceived as internalised and constitutive of the actor, it does not require self-reflection 
and captures the unconscious automaticity of practice (and habit). 
 
Practice theory is thus a means of examining everyday routines that are the manifestation of 
deeply-embedded beliefs. While these deeply-embedded beliefs can change, if they are 
conspicuous at all it is for their continuity. Thus, I contend, Practice provides order by 
establishing parameters that delineate what is acceptable (or appropriate) behaviour. These 
practices or habit establish the arena for contestation. This contestation could be manifest in 
adjusted practices but these will be interpreted as an affirmation of the deeply-embedded 
beliefs. 
 
Practice therefore provides a framework that enables an understanding of why actors behave 
in a particular way, while also providing a means of understanding that such behaviour 
evolves and adjusts. This is the basis of McCourt’s article; his argument is that both Practice 
theory and Relationalism – actions are a consequence of forces (such as interests, 
preferences, institutions) rather than individuals with immutable goals – are constructivist. 
McCourt writes, 
 
Taken together, practice-relationalism can be considered a twin approach because the 
aim in each is to recover a more appropriate understanding of the social in social 
explanation by foregrounding process over fixity (emphasis in original).47 
 
While sympathetic to McCourt’s interpretation of Practice as constructivist I contend that the 
social is not “process over fixity” but process and fixity. As the actor’s behaviour adjusts and 
evolves, rather than asking, is the actor complying with the norms in place, it is more 
pertinent to ask, what does the actor’s altered behaviour reveal about their understanding of 
the norm in this current context? It could be that the shared understanding of the norm 
remains amongst the actors because the flexibility of its meaning is sufficient to 
accommodate such adjustments. Niemann and Schillinger recognise this when they write, 
‘our findings could also be interpreted as demonstrating that focusing on intersubjective 
sharedness rather than contestation is what defines norm research (emphasis added).48 
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However, contestation is not separate from a shared understanding of the norm but rather it 
reveals that shared understandings can be ambiguous, and here the processes involved can be 
analysed, including whether different cultural scripts are evident, and that this ambiguity 
reveals what is not contested. That is, the process reveals the parameters – the fixity – in 
which the social takes place. 
 
In summary, utilising the norm degeneration literature to show that ambiguity in meaning 
makes a norm more resilient helps to close the gap in the conventional/critical divide by 
focusing attention on the contestation that arises in the norm’s ambiguity. That is a shared 
understanding broadly interpreted exists – it is fixed – but its meaning and application is 
subject to various interpretations depending upon the actors’ understanding of the context. In 
order to explain the origins of these different interpretations we can appreciate that actors 
carry normative baggage with them into their encounters. Rather than thinking of these 
cultural scripts as fixed it is useful to see them as part of the unconscious, deeply embedded, 
beliefs that actors have and here practice theory reveals that these beliefs about what is 
appropriate has both elements of continuity and change. However, rather than seeing actor 
interactions as a battle between different interpretations with the goal to achieve an agreed 
understanding - that is, contestation producing a uniformed shared understanding as to the 
norm’s content and application - we should instead see contestation as an ongoing and 
inherent feature of these interactions and what these discursive battles reveal is different 
meanings and applications of agreed norms. Thus we can have actors sharing an 
understanding of a norm, such as the example of a British identity, but their understanding of 
what this means (its content) for how they behave (its application) can be different. 
 
 
Agonistic Institution 
 
What though are the implications of this ambiguity for understanding norms as the source of 
legitimacy for regional organisations? If the members of organisations are forever disputing 
the meaning and application of the organisation’s norms then it presumably it has neither 
direction (whither?) nor much of a future (wither). An answer lies in what Wiener calls 
“agonistic institutions”.49 Agonism sees value in contestation and specifically that the goal of 
debate and discussion ought not to be the achievement of consensus and harmonious 
agreement, but rather the empowering of different positions and to provide an arena where 
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differences can be confronted.50 The value of contestation is captured in Bonnie Honig’s 
claim that for agonistic theory, ‘to affirm the perpetuity of the contest is not to celebrate a 
world without points of stabilization; it is to affirm the reality of perpetual contest, even 
within an ordered setting, and to identify the affirmative dimension of contestation’.51 
Agonistic institutions thus provide an arena for this contestation. They enable contestation to 
become visible as the actors’ understandings are exposed; it is the visibility of the ambiguity 
in meaning that enables actors to share a contested understanding. Essentially we agree on the 
norm but we reserve the right to agree to disagree about its meaning and application 
depending upon the context at the time. This becomes apparent in the case study: ASEAN is 
an agonistic institution. 
 
 
ASEAN as an agonistic institution 
 
ASEAN has ten member states and the membership is often divided into the Cold War and 
post-Cold War members, with the latter referred to by their initials; the CMLV countries.52 
This division, while ostensibly on economic/development terms, is often used to distinguish 
the ASEAN membership politically between those that interpret the modus operandi of 
ASEAN – the ASEAN Way – broadly and those that have a narrower interpretation. Thus 
references to a two-tier ASEAN are not only used to show a development gap in ASEAN 
between the founders and the CMLV, but also the desire amongst some of the former group 
to develop and adjust its procedures, which is often opposed by the latter. It is the 
combination of an increased membership with diverse needs, coupled to the increasing 
institutionalisation of ASEAN with its community building ambitions, that has raised 
questions about the efficacy of the ASEAN Way and the need to adjust it to better reflect the 
challenges the Association faces. The claim that the ASEAN Way is not fit for purpose is 
thus prevalent in many thoughts about ASEAN as it turned fifty. However to interpret this as 
norm degeneration is to misinterpret the fixity of the constitutive norms that underpin the 
ASEAN Way, and the contestation about them that reveals, not their decline, but their 
enduring quality.  What therefore is the ASEAN Way? 
 
The ASEAN Way describes the process of engagement between the members and it 
emphasizes informality, consultation and consensus-decision making and the avoidance of 
unwanted interference in the domestic affairs of other members. Often posited in contrast to 
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Western decision-making the ASEAN Way avoids adversarial posturing, majority voting and 
legalistic governance structures to solve disputes.53 Instead, the ASEAN Way is designed to 
ensure that in discussion there is no public shaming of other members and all can save face. 
The ASEAN Way is therefore a process explaining how ASEAN members interact and this 
process comes to inform the practice of member states’ diplomats and the staff in the ASEAN 
Secretariat.54 It has become so deeply-embedded that its component parts are constitutive 
norms for ASEAN.55 In essence, a modus operandi that enables states that, for the most part, 
freed themselves from a controlling colonial power to create an institution that does not 
replace that colonial power with a supranational organisation that could also impinge on their 
independence. ASEAN is inherently inter-governmental and the ASEAN Way is a process 
that enables independent sovereign states to work cooperatively together in a familiar, non-
threatening, environment. It is this familiarity that underpins the sense of friendship that 
ASEAN promotes and symbolises; the latter most visible in the routine arms-crossed 
handshake that is performed at public ASEAN meetings. 
 
The ASEAN Way reveals that as a conflict resolution institution ASEAN is not a tool to 
resolve disputes but rather to manage them. For proponents of ASEAN this management 
equates to ameliorating tensions among the membership and enables them to settle their 
disputes peacefully. For critics, it reflects ASEAN’s inability to resolve disputes; it is a mere 
talk shop that is largely irrelevant to understanding the foreign policies of Southeast Asian 
states. That ASEAN is a talk shop enables it to be an agonistic institution, and the vagueness 
of the ASEAN Way ensures that, despite the frequent questioning of its value, it has endured. 
It is precisely its ability to frame discussion and thus guide what ASEAN members can, and 
cannot do, that has attracted conventional constructivists to examine ASEAN. Although not 
straightforwardly a conventional constructivist, Acharya’s work spawned a number of works 
that sought to identify the norms that guide members’ behaviour, their origins, and their 
application.56 While providing intellectual succour for the ASEAN Way, these accounts 
invariably highlighted a gap between what members said they would do and what they 
actually did. There appeared to be a compliance problem. Hence when reflecting on ASEAN 
as it turned fifty, Lee Jones, a critical scholar whose work on the ASEAN Way reveals the 
manipulation of the Association’s modus operandi to further entrench the political/economic 
elites’ dominion57, framed incidences of non-compliance with the ASEAN Way as 
“departures”, “violations”, and abandonment.58 For critical constructivists it is impossible to 
be non-compliant; the incidences of departures that Jones notes are routine reinterpretations 
15 
 
and thus contestations of the ASEAN Way as members recast the ASEAN Way to fit their 
prevailing beliefs and preferences as to its meaning. Hence the ASEAN Way is just as fertile 
a ground for critical constructivists because, as Acharya correctly states, it ‘is a loosely used 
concept whose meaning remains vague and contested’.59 Here Mathew Davies’ focus on 
rituals and symbols becomes insightful. For Davies, ASEAN’s rituals provide the explanation 
for its continuation, not because they represent a uniformed shared meaning by members, but 
because they ‘generate order by creating shared experiences, even when those are interpreted 
in different ways’.60 While Davies is seeking to distance rituals and symbols from 
constructivism, I contend these are the practices that bridge the constructivist divide by 
creating fixity on an agreed understanding of what the rituals and symbols are, while 
allowing within this parameter contestation over their interpretation.   
 
Contestation within the ASEAN Way: 
 
While it is to be expected that constitutive norms are not reflected upon because they have 
become deeply-embedded and thus guide behaviour without conscious thought, ASEAN acts 
as an agonistic institution because it reaffirms these norms frequently in its declarations and 
also in the practice of member states’ diplomats in the ASEAN Secretariat, as well as the 
Secretariat staff themselves. They are also routinely used by critics when member states 
appear to be acting in contravention of them. The most dramatic example of this occurred in 
July 2012 when, for the first time in the Association’s history, the Foreign Ministers were 
unable to agree on the text of their communique and did not release one. The sticking point 
was over reference to the disputed islands in the South China Sea and revealed that the Chair, 
Cambodia, was more concerned about offending China than in reaching a compromise with 
its ASEAN colleagues, notably Vietnam and the Philippines. According to Bilahari Kausikan, 
Ambassador-at-Large at the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this was a most 
‘egregious example of the disregard of regional interest’ by an ASEAN member.61 This 
impression of a divided membership was further corroborated by Malaysia’s public rebuke to 
ASEAN over the 2017 Rohingya crisis. The 2017 crisis arose when government forces in 
Myanmar attacked the Rohingya people living in Rakhine state. This action was condemned 
internationally as “ethnic cleansing” and led to much criticism directed at Aung San Suu Kyi. 
In their September 2017 Chairman Statement ASEAN’s condemnation of the use of force 
conflated the violence used by the government forces to that from the Arakan Rohingya 
Salvation Army, and rather than an assessment of the conflict ASEAN focused on the 
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humanitarian disaster that unfolded on the Myanmar-Bangladeshi border. Malaysia not only 
took the step of publicly “disassociating” itself from the statement it also called it a 
“misrepresentation” of the situation. This appeared to show Malaysia failing to act in 
accordance with two component parts of the ASEAN Way; non-interference (for Malaysia 
the Myanmar government was culpable for the crisis) and consensus-decision making (the 
statement did not use the name Rohingya to describe the Muslims and so Malaysia would not 
agree to it). The Malaysian action was seen as evidence of the ASEAN Way faltering and 
evidence of ASEAN facing (another) crisis as it revealed a religious divide amongst the 
membership. Beyond these two headlining grabbing events there is a general concern 
amongst commentators that the ASEAN Way is ill-suited to achieving the ambitious 
community-building goals the Association has set itself. Is the ASEAN Way a problem to be 
solved to ensure that ASEAN does not wither? Can it instead adjust its modus operandi to 
better implement its community blueprints and thus alter its direction (whither)?  
 
What a critical constructivist approach can reveal is not an answer to these questions, but 
rather to problematize the questions themselves and reflect on what the ASEAN Way is. 
Rather than a fixed set of regulative norms guiding practice, the ASEAN Way consists of 
constitutive norms that are recognised, accepted and can act as sites of visible contestation. 
However, as will be seen, this is not a problem to be solved but rather an essential part of 
how ASEAN manages intra-mural tensions. This can be witnessed in how ASEAN responded 
to Malaysia’s public dissociation from its statement on the Rohingya crisis noted below. 
However, we need to understand what consensus means to appreciate the parameters in 
which this contestation occurred. 
 
i. Consensus 
 
Consensus has always meant that state elite could engage in a discussion in the knowledge 
that if a point of disagreement existed then the issue would be shelved until a time when the 
disagreement ceased to exist. In essence, it ensured that no decision could be taken against 
outright opposition and so it enabled the elite to be at ease with one another and no doubt 
helped develop the familiarity amongst the elite noted earlier. Very importantly it ensured a 
sense of equality among the members; there is no ASEAN Security Council. Consensus was 
thus about being comfortable, to a greater or lesser degree, with the subjects being discussed 
and decisions reached. This understanding of consensus was captured in the formula, ASEAN 
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minus X (A-X). That is, ASEAN can proceed with a decision where some ASEAN members 
are more comfortable with the decision than others, so long as those others are not opposed. It 
did not therefore equate consensus with unanimity. It did not require all members to agree to 
participate and it did not give one member a veto. This latter point is important to appreciate; 
how can equality exist if one member can prevent others from acting? If a member was 
opposed to an ASEAN decision, but it was in a minority of one, then consensus would 
publicly be said to have been achieved. Through a process of consultation, the anomalous one 
would be reassured that its concerns would be respected and in return it would not prevent the 
others from proceeding. Being opposed did not mean becoming estranged and consensus via 
consultation ensured ASEAN was united in how it managed the wishes of all members. In 
those circumstances where those for and against are more even, then it is not unusual for the 
publication of a statement to accompany a declaration. While the declaration is likely to 
contain passages that often appear contradictory and reveal different positions within the 
membership, the statement is used to clarify a particular interpretation. For example, when 
the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) was adopted in 2012 it was accompanied by 
the Phenom Penh Statement, which sought to counter the expected accusation that the AHRD 
fell short of international human rights standards. In those circumstances where more than 
one was opposed and no amount of consultation would resolve concerns then consensus 
equated to adjournment. Such an understanding of consensus thus creates broad parameters in 
which contention can play out. This understanding of consensus has though been challenged 
(contested) by two developments.  
 
The first is the increasing size of the membership and specifically the approach adopted by 
the CMLV members. These members are generally more cautious about the direction that 
ASEAN’s community building project is taking the Association. Do these ambitious goals 
foretell a more integrated Southeast Asia that will require a regional framework not dissimilar 
to the European Union to oversee its implementation and management? Where would this 
leave sovereignty and territorial independence? Given these concerns the four CMLV 
members, and on an issue-by-issue basis they can sometimes rely on the support of one or 
more of the other six, are able to present a sizable minority that is uncomfortable if not 
opposed to the direction other members are seeking. This ability to block initiatives, or hinder 
their implementation by resisting effective monitoring systems, has equated consensus with 
unanimity. Seen in this interpretation consensus is regarded as a problem and a bane rather 
than a boon for ASEAN.62  
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This interpretation of consensus can be clearly discerned in the second development. The 
second development is the codification of the A-X principle in the ASEAN Charter, but only 
in regard to economic commitments. This has led to a restriction of the principle’s application 
with the implication that what was a general principle that underpinned a shared 
understanding of how consensus worked for all ASEAN decisions now only applies to 
economic matters. Hence Ralf Emmers’ appeal to extend A-X to other areas of ASEAN 
activity can be interpreted as a contestation of how the A-X formula is currently interpreted.63 
It is not therefore that consensus needs to be replaced, but what can be witnessed is a 
contention over what consensus means, both in terms of its content (not unanimity) and its 
application (not solely economic matters).  
 
This contestation over the meaning of consensus and the ensuing debate about wither and/or 
whither ASEAN can be seen in a different reading of the ASEAN fallout over the 
Association’s response to the 2017 Rohingya crisis. In response to Malaysia’s disassociation 
the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) issued a statement saying that the 
Philippines respected Malaysia’s stance and that ‘since Malaysia has different views on some 
issues, out of respect for its position, we decided that instead of a foreign ministers statement, 
we would issue a chairman’s statement that would reflect the general sentiments of the other 
foreign ministers’. The DFA went on to add that the statement was issued after extensive 
consultations with Malaysia and that ‘The Philippines as chair tolerates the public 
manifestation of dissenting voices’, as this, ‘demonstrates a new level of maturity on how we 
implement ASEAN’s consensus principle when confronted with issues affecting national 
interests’.64 This reveals continuity with a shared understanding of both non-interference and 
consensus. In the case of non-interference, according to Tang Siew Mun, Myanmar 
‘supported the Statement as it understood that ASEAN’s credibility would be damaged 
otherwise. It was prepared to shoulder the heavy domestic political cost for going along with 
the ASEAN position’.65 With regard to Malaysia, the ruling regime was also facing criticism 
although in this instance it was domestic. The specific matter concerned the fear in the ruling 
Malay party – United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) – that with a general election 
scheduled to occur within a year, and the Malay vote potentially divided between five parties, 
it was necessary for UMNO to be vocally supportive of the Muslim Rohingya otherwise its 
Muslim credentials would be impugned. It was in this context – that the Malaysian ruling 
regime felt it necessary to publicly support the Rohingya – that ASEAN reflected the 
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difficulty of achieving consensus by issuing a Chairman’s statement and not a Foreign 
Ministers’ statement. The sensitivity of the matter for Malaysia was also reflected in ASEAN 
members not publicly rebuking Malaysia for the rebuke that Malaysia gave ASEAN and 
instead they moved forward to the implementing of humanitarian assistance. Seen in this light 
ASEAN’s statement and Malaysia’s response can be seen as evidence of contestation within 
the shared meanings of consensus and non-interference and in compliance with the 
parameters established by the norms. 
 
ii. Non-interference 
 
What is important to recognise is that the 2017 Rohingya crisis is not exceptional but rather 
has precedence with the other constitutive norms. In the context of the 1997-98 Asian 
financial crisis, which also lead to questions about ASEAN’s future, it was non-interference 
that became contested. In this instance the contestation came in the guise of flexible 
engagement, which was proposed in 1998 by the then Thai Foreign Minister and future 
ASEAN Secretary-General, Dr Surin Pitsuwan. Surin was though adamant that he was not 
seeking to replace non-interference with flexible engagement66 but rather to adjust its 
meaning to better reflect the increasingly interdependent environment that ASEAN states 
inhabited. His proposal remained consistent with the support role that is core to non-
interference – non-interference is not indifference it is designed to deflect criticism aimed at 
the state elite – and through a process of negotiation and consultation a consensus was arrived 
at with ASEAN adopting “enhanced interaction”.67 This was regarded as a rejection of 
flexible engagement, and it did represent a watering down of Surin’s proposal, but the 
process of contestation that Surin initiated did reveal a willingness to adopt a more open 
approach to non-interference and the 2000s witnessed greater cooperation on transnational 
issues and engaging Burma. Non-interference therefore remained a constitutive, deeply-
embedded, fixed, norm but what it meant and how it was applied altered to reflect the 
prevailing context the membership inhabited.68  
 
iii.  Informality 
 
This contestation over the ASEAN Way can also be witnessed in another constitutive 
element; the notion of informality. This was originally epitomised by the Association’s 
infrequent meetings – the first ASEAN Heads of States meeting occurred nine years after it 
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was formed – and lack of an institutional base. ASEAN has though had a secretariat in 
Jakarta since 1976 and now hosts hundreds of meetings a year. Informality is certainly no 
longer epitomised by the infrequency of formal meetings, but this was only the manifestation 
of informality. Informality captures the non-binding and non-legalistic procedures of 
ASEAN, which together avoid the authority for the implementation of ASEAN action plans 
residing anywhere else than national governments. Contestation over the shared 
understanding of informality is captured in the current battle over what member states 
understand by a rules-based ASEAN. In the ASEAN Charter the members gave ASEAN a 
legal and institutional framework, and one interpretation of this is that the rule of law, and the 
role of institutions to uphold the law, should develop alongside the ASEAN Way as the 
Association’s new modus operandi. The Charter was adopted in 2007 and the fact that little 
has changed indicates that there is a lack of clarity over what conveying a legal personality on 
ASEAN actually means. However, it is precisely this vagueness that creates the site for 
contestation and various proposals are being floated and discussed that range from the 
formalization of an ASEAN judicial body, to creating a shared understanding of regional 
legal standards, to monitoring compliance with ASEAN action plans. What is pertinent is 
that, as with flexible engagement and the application of A-X, the debates also include 
discussing whether the ASEAN Way is the antithesis of a rules-based approach and thus an 
obstacle. What can be witnessed is the adoption of phrases in draft papers such as “flexible 
use of the ASEAN Way”, the need “to invest effort in changing modalities” and 
distinguishing between a “pre-Charter flexibility and a post-Charter bindingness”. In contrast 
one can also discern counter narratives that place the rule of law within the embrace of 
informality, where informality means identifying behaviours that are unacceptable, learning 
best practice from other regions and also ensuring that local or indigenous justice is not 
disparaged. The latter clearly placing the rule of law within the particularities of an ASEAN 
context. The site for contestation over what a rules-based ASEAN means and how it relates to 
ASEAN’s non-legalistic culture for managing members’ relations is being established. What 
ASEAN’s history of norm contestation reveals is that rather than interpreting this as non-
compliance with a constitutive norm, it is instead a reaffirmation of ASEAN’s informality as 
its adjusts this norm to reflect the altering post-Charter context in which its community-
building aspirations are pursued.  
 
 
Conclusion: 
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Whither or wither for constructivism and ASEAN? For both it is surely whither. If the 
strength of a theory is that it has longevity and can be utilised by generations of academics 
and policymakers, then the cue for Constructivism is to replicate the broad church approach 
that has served Realism and Liberalism so well. Realism is riven with divisions from 
behavioural realists to structural realists, to offensive and defensive realists. For many the 
neo-liberal institutionalist turn seemed to jettison so much of liberalism it appeared more 
realist-lite than a branch of liberalism. Constructivists, conventional and critical, share the 
belief that the world is socially constructed and from this starting point many contestations 
can begin, including what is the purpose of theory anyway. In this article I show that when it 
comes to the fixity and guiding potential for norms there is room for both conventional and 
critical constructivists; within parameters established by practice and habit that creates a 
shared understanding, contestation is normality as it reveals the day-to-day negotiation and 
persuasion that is politics. Contestation therefore reveals not only different interpretations of 
a norm but the boundaries of the contention reveal what is not contested.  
 
At fifty ASEAN is no more becoming irrelevant than at any other time in its history; it is not 
withering. The debates and discussions about the ability of the ASEAN Way to underpin the 
accomplishment of an ASEAN community are the latest debates and discussions that are a 
continuous feature of the contestation over the meaning and application of the ASEAN Way. 
ASEAN is not facing a crisis because its members are failing to act in accordance with the 
ASEAN Way it is experiencing the normality of its modus operandi being contested. The 
existence of an expanded, two-tier, ASEAN makes such contestation take on different forms 
but this is a replication of member states engagement over what the ASEAN Way means that 
will be familiar to ASEAN statesmen past and present. ASEAN’s direction of travel is 
uncertain and thus it is a question of whither ASEAN as its community-building ambitions 
become realised.  
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